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VERMONT YANKEE AND THE EVOLUTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE:
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND REFLECTIONS
by
Patrick Charles McGinley*
HE SUPREME COURT's recent decision in Vermont Yankee

Inc.'
Corp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,
Nuclear
a sweeping denunciation of lower federal courts' treatrepresentsPower
ment of "notice and comment" rulemaking. ' This commentary will
and its impact on the development of adreview that decision
3
law.
ministrative
NOTICE AND COMMENT RULEMAKING

"Notice and comment" rulemaking under the Administrative Pro4
cedure Act (APA) requires an agency to publish notice of proposed
action in the Federal Register and afford interested persons an oppor-

tunity to submit comments. When a final rule is adopted it must be accompanied by a written explanation for its adoption.
This informal "notice and comment" procedure allows for considerably less participation by interested persons in the rulemaking
process than the more formal APA "on the record"

s

or adjudicatory

*A.B. 1968. Dickenson College; J.D. 1971. Duke University; Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
'435 U.S. 5 19 (1978). rev'g by a unanimous court Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
'For general discussions of "notice and comment" rulemaking see, Wright. The
Courtsand the Rulemaking Process, The Limits of JudicialReview, 59 CORNELL L REV.
375 (1974); Stewart, The Development Of Administrative And Quasi-Constitutional
Law In Judicial Review Of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons From The Clean
Air Act, 62 IowA L. REv. 713, 729-33 (1977); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" under
the Administrative ProcedureAct: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 42 U. Cmi. L REV.
401 (1975); Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L. J. 38
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Pedersen]; Stewart, The Reformation Of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L REV. 1669 (1975) Fuchs, Development And Diversification In Administrative Rulemaking, 72 Nw. U. L REV. 83 (1977); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINIST"ATIVE LAW TREATISE, ch. 6 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as I K. DAVIS, ADMIN.
LAW TREAnSEj.

'See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Three Perspectives, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1804 (1978); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMIN. LAW
TREATISE, supra note 2, at J§ 6:35-6:37.
'5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553 (1976). See note 33, infra.
1id. at 1 553 (c). 556, 557.
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rulemaking which involves trial-type procedures which may include
the right to discovery and cross-examination.' "On the record"
rulemaking is traditionally viewed as accompanying judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, while "notice and comment" rulemaking
is said to be legislative in character (interested parties may comment
but the agency officials are free to rely on any factual information
they desire without making much information available for judicial
review or allowing public response thereto). APA "notice and comment" procedures do not require the compilation of an evidentiary
record. 7 In addition, the written explanations for decision making required by the APA was originally seen as a formality and not
rigorously reviewed.$ The APA in section 704, however, directs the
courts to review agency action.' Section 706 of the APA sets forth the
scope of that review.'
The result of strict adherence to the literal requirements of the APA
was that "judicial review of the merits of agency decisions was
necessarily shallow and deferential.""
The lack of an adequate record upon judicial review has triggered
lower federal courts to devise their own ways of insuring that they
could carry out their reviewing functions in a meaningful manner.
The courts have required agencies to disclose the factual basis
underlying proposed and promulgated rules. Moreover, agencies have
been directed to respond both to public comments and criticism of
proposed rules and to the data set forth by the agency in support
thereof. As a result of such court mandated proceedings there has
developed in administrative proceedings what is generally known as
"hybrid rulemaking." These judicially prompted procedures have
generally resulted in extensively documented written records in
federal agency rulemaking, thus significantly enhancing the quality
of administrative decision making as well as the opportunity for
meaningful judicial review. 2

'The scope of the "on the record" hearing mandate of section 553 (c) of the APA was
limited in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 410 U.S. 224 (1973). For a
critical examination of that case see, Nathanson, Probing The Mind Of The Administrator. Hearing Variations And Standards Of Judicial Review Under The AdministrativeProcedureAct And Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLum. L. REV. 721(1975).
'See, e.g., Pacific Coast European Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197 (9th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 958 (1965).
'See, e.g., Automotive Parts and Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 337 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
95 U.S.C. § 704 (1976).
"Id. at § 706.
"Stewart, Vermont Yankee And The Evolution Of Administrative Procedure, 91
HARV. L REv. 1805, 1812 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Stewart].
"For commentary on "notice and comment" and "hybrid rulemaking" see note 2,
supra.
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VERMONT YANKEE: THE AGENCY PROCEEDINGS

Vermont Yankee involved the licensing of nuclear power plants and
the "notice and comment" rulemaking procedures of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC). The focus here is on the rulemaking
portion of the Court's opinion.
The rule challenged concerned the environmental effects of the
disposal of nuclear wastes generated by atomic power plants." Having been grated a permit by the NRC to build a nuclear power plant,
Vermont Yankee applied for an operating license."' The Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) objected on several grounds and
hearings were held on the application. Excluded from consideration
at the hearings, over NRDC objection, was the issue of the environmental effects of the disposal of nuclear wastes to be produced
by Vermont Yankee's plant. This ruling was affirmed by the NRC Appeal Board."
Shortly thereafter the Commission, making specific reference to the
Vermont Yankee license, initiated rulemaking proceedings pertaining
to nuclear waste disposal, "that would specifically deal with the question of consideration of environmental effects associated with the
uranium fuel cycle in the individual cost-benefit analyses for . . .
nuclear power reactors.""0

"Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1976); indicated that the proposed plant would
produce 160 pounds of plutonium wastes yearly during its forty-year life span. Said the
Court of Appeals:
Plutonium is generally accepted as among the most toxic substances known; inhalation of a single microscopic particle is thought to be sufficient to cause
cancer. Moreover, with a half-life of 25,000 years, plutonium must be isolated
from the environment for 250,000 years before it becomes harmless. Operation
of the facility ... will also produce substantial quantities of other "high level"
radioactive wastes [whichl... must be isolated from the environment for "only"
600 to 1000 years (footnotes omitted).

Id. at 638-39.
See also, Scientists' Institute for Public Information. Inc. v. AEC ("SIPI"), 481 F.2d
1079, 1098 (1973). But we, B. Cohen, The Hazards in Plutonium lspersal.Institute for
Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge, Tenn. (1975); Bethe, The Necessity of Fission Power. 234
SciErriNc AMERiCAN 21, 29 (1976).
It should be noted that the term "disposal" may be misleading; the only known
means to "dispose" nuclear wastes is to store them in physical isolation for extraordinary time periods until they "break down" naturally.
'Licensing of commercial nuclear power plants involves two separate proceedings;
first to determine whether the plant should be contructed and the second to determine
whether the facility should be licensed-to operate. See, Power Reactor Development Co.
v. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 411
(1961).
"In re Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 4 A.E.C. 930 (1972).

"435 U.S. at 528.
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Proposed rules were published for public comment in the Federal
Register.' 7 In a supplemental notice of hearing the NRC set forth the
procedures it intended to follow in conducting the rulemaking proceeding.' 8 The environmental survey and extensive background
documents (prepared by the NRC staff) upon which the proposed rule
was premised were made available to the public before hearings were
held. Participants in the hearings were afforded an opportunity to
present their position. Representation by counsel was permitted; written and oral statements could be given and incorporated into the
record. At the conclusion of the hearing, a transcript was made
available to the public and the record remained open for thirty days
for the filing of supplemental written statements.'°
After the hearing the NRC issued a rule which required that in a
nuclear power plant applicant's environmental report, the environmental effects of management of nuclear wastes should be factored into the environmental costs of licensing nuclear power reactors
and should be set forth in a table that had been a part of the Commission's environmental survey. Most important from the environmentalist standpoint was the fact that the rule stated "no further discussion of such environmental effects shall be required""' in individual
licensing proceedings.
Also of significance was the fact that the rule expressed the conclusion that the environmental effects of nuclear waste disposal were
"relatively insignificant."'-2
VERMONT YANKEE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

On appeal the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia indicated at the outset that, "an agency may abuse its discretion by proceeding to a decision which the record before it will not sustain, in the
sense that it raises fundamental questions for which the agency has
" 2
adduced no reasoned answers. 2
After thoroughly examining the administrative record the Court of
Appeals found that the rule was supported only by
generalities ...not subject to rigorous probing-in any form-but when
apparently substantial criticisms were brought to the Commissions's attention, it simply ignored them, or brushed them aside without an
answer....

"37 Fed. Reg. 24,191 (1972).
"1435 U.S. at 529.

'l"d.
1039 Fed. Reg. 14,191 (1974)(subsequently codified in 10 C.F.R. § 5 1.20(e)).

"1435 U.S. at 530.
"Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 646 (D.C. Cir 1976).
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The Commission's action in cutting off consideration of waste
disposal.. .issues in licensing proceedings based on the cursory development of the facts ...

was capricious and arbitrary."

Thus, finding the record to be insufficient to support the rule the
court set it aside and remanded to the agency.
THE SUPREME COURT REVERSAL

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed4 and in a harshly-worded
opinion remanded to the Court of Appeals."
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a unanimous Court,2 found that the
Court of Appeals struck down the rule "because of the perceived inadequacies of the procedures employed in the rulemaking proceedings. ' O
The Court used strong language in rejecting the Court of Appeals'
position on rulemaking procedures. The Court of Appeals, said the
Supreme Court, had "seriously misread or misapplied "27 applicable
law by "engrafting their own notions of proper procedures upon
agencies."2 8 Justice Rehnquist found the court's decision to be a
"serious departure from the very basic tenent of administrative law
that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of
procedure."'
The sweeping language of the strident denunciation of the Court of
Appeals centers on Justice Rehnquist's statement, "Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the 'administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them
to discharge their multitudinous duties.""
"I3d. at 653, 655.
14435 U.S. at 549.
"Justices Blackman and Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case. See 435 U.S. at 558.
"Id. at 541. Respondents had argued "'that the [Court of Appeals] merely held that
the record was inadequate to enable the reviewing court to determine whether the agency had fulfilled its statutory obligation." Justice Rehnquist concluded that while the
matter was "not entirely free from doubt" the lower court decision had been based on
inadequate administrative procedures.Id. at 539, 541.

"Id.at 525.
281d.

"Id. at 544.
3'1d. at 543 (quoting Federal Communications Comm'n v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279,
290 (1965); Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134, 143 (1940)). The Court indicated that this principle had been upheld in a variety of
applications. See, e.g., Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322 (1957);
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Wallace Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317
U.S. 501 (1943); Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56
(1939); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
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The Court went on to categorically reject judicial input into the
development of agency rulemaking procedures, "all of this leaves little doubt that Congress intended that the discretion of agencies and
not that of the courts be exercised in determining when extra procedural devices should be employed" (emphasis added)."'
Several harms were perceived by the Court to flow from the approach advocated by the Court of Appeals. Agencies required to
operate under a vague judicial injunction to employ the "best procedures" would result in agency overreaction-that is, the adoption of
full adjudicatory (trial-type) procedures 2 in every case-seriously interfering with the statutory (APA) scheme. The result would be grossly
overtaxed agencies which could no longer avail themselves of the efficiencies of informal "notice and comment" rulemaking. Most importantly, the Court found that the adequacy of the record should be
judged not by the type of procedural devices employed, but rather by
a determination of whether the agency has followed the procedures
mandated by statute, here the APA. 31

31435 U.S. at 546.

"Such procedures would include pre-hearing discovery and cross-examination.
"35 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). Section 553 provides:
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that there is involved(1)a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or
(2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served
or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with the law. The notice
shall include(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute. (emphasis added) this
subsection does not apply-.
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and
a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.
After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after oppor-
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In concluding, Justice Rehnquist stated:
In short, nothing in the APA ..... the circumstances of this case, the
nature of the issues being considered, past agency practice, or the
statutory mandate under which the Commission operates permitted the
court to review and overturn the rulemaking proceeding on the basis of
the procedural devices employed (or not employed) by the Commission
so long as the Commission employed at least a statutory minima, a matter about which there is no doubt in this case.'

IMPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT OPINION

The thrust of the Court's message in Vermont Yankee is clear. In
disapproving judicial involvement in agency procedures the Court
seems to cast aside the "hybrid rulemaking" procedures painstakingly
developed by the courts of appeal over the last decade.31 The lower
federal courts have grafted those procedures on the "notice and comment" rulemaking procedures outlined in section 553 of the
APA-precisely the type of judicial intervention condemned by the
Court in Vermont Yankee.
In one fell swoop the Supreme Court has shaken the foundation of
what Professor Davis has recognized as "the general excellence of the
new system of rulemaking procedure that has suddenly developed
during the 1970's ..... -1
Davis attempts to dismiss Vermont Yankee as an unrealistic guide
to the future role to be played by courts in administrative rulemaking
procedure." He bases this view on an analysis which concludes that
the language of Vermont Yankee has implications much broader than
the Court could possibly have intended because he finds that the
Court's statements are "largely at variance with previous Supreme
tunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of
this subsection.
(d) the required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not
less than 30 days before its effective date, except(I) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a
a restriction;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published
with the rule.
(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
11435 U.S. at 548.
"l K. DAVIS, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE, supra note 2, at 611.
'Old. at 627
"Id. at 612.
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even though the Court indicated no intent to change

While Professor Davis views Vermont Yankee as aberrational,
other distinguished commentators like Professor Byse welcome the
Court's opinion "as a needed corrective to an unwholesome trend
[development of hybrid rulemaking procedures] in the lower federal
courts.""8 The upshot of Byse's commentary is that courts should play
an extremely limited role in establishing rulemaking procedures for
administrative agencies.
Says Byse:
I agree. . . that there may be instances in which compliance with the
minimum notice, comment, and statement requirements of section 553
would not produce an adequate record for review and that therefore additional procedures would be appropriate. But this observation hardly
compels the conclusion that it is the province of the courts to impose
such procedures. Additional procedures should not be imposed by the
reviewing court, except possibly as a last resort or, as the Vermont
Yankee opinion states, in compelling circumstances."
Professor Byse opts for an approach adopted by the Administrative
Conference of the United States. 4' The Administrative Conference
recommendations, in effect, place the burden on the agency and not

"Id. at 611. Professor Davis suggests that the Court misreads the two cases it relies
on in concluding that the APA establishes maximum procedural requirements which
Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures. Those two cases, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.,
406 U.S. 742 (1972), and United States v. Florida East Coast Railroad Co., 410 U.S.
224 (1973), "Neither ...held or said anything at all about a maximum limit on courts
or about unwillingness of Congress 'to have the courts' do or not do anything." I K.
DAVIS. ADMIN. LAw TREATISE, supra note 2. at 612.
"See Byse, Vermont Yankee And The Evolution Of Administrative Procedure: A
Somewhat Different View, 91 H,Rv. L. REV. 1823 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bysel. See
also Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy,
L. REv. 1833 (1978).
91 HARNV.
"Byse, supra note 39, at 1824.
"The Administrative Conference of the United States was created in 1964 as a permanent federal agency, established by statute to be a peer of the major independent
regulatory agencies. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-75 (1976) (orginally enacted as 78 Stat. 615
(1964)). The Conference is comprised of 75 to 91 persons, a majority of whom always
must be representatives from the various Executive Departments and federal agencies;
private citizens are a strong minority of the composition of the Conference. The theory
behind the creation of the commission is that the various federal agencies can work
together effectively to revise and improve their practices and procedures.
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the courts to develop adequate procedures to insure a full and fair
hearing and reasoned administrative decision-making."2
Professor Byse recognizes that although in his view the agency has
responsibility for deciding what procedures to use, the courts have
their own role to play as reviewer of agency decisions. Byse suggests,
however, that judicial grafting of procedural requirements onto agency and APA required procedures is not necessary to insure meaningful

'12 ADMINISTRATIVE
AND

REPORTS

66-67

CONFERENCE
(1970-1972);

OF

THE

UNITED

ADMINISTRATIVE

STATES,

CONFERENCE

RECOMMENDATIONS
OF

THE

UNITED

STATES, 1976 Report 44-47 (1977). The Conference suggests that procedures in addition
to those outlined in the APA should sometimes be required by an agency where there
are:
circumstances tending to suggest the desirability of using such procedural
devises are that (I) the scientific, technical, or other data relevant to the proposed rule are complex; (2) the problem posed is so openended that an agency
may profit from receiving diverse public views before publishing a proposed rule
for final comment; and (3) the costs that errors in the rule may impose, including
health, welfare, and environmental losses imposed on the public and pecuniary
expenses imposed on the affected industries and consumers of their products, are

significant.

Id. at 45.
Professor Byse listed specific additional procedures which were suggested:
1. Providing from the outset for the possibility of two cycles of notice and comment when the agency anticipates that the issues will be unusually complex, as
when the notice of proposed rule making is expressed in general terms.
2. Providing for a second cyle of comment when comments filed or the agency's
response to such comments present important new issues or serious conflicts of
data.
3. Incorporating in the notice a summary of the agency's attitudes toward the
critical issues in the proceeding and a description of the data on which the agency relies.
4. Providing an explanation of the tests and other procedures utilized by the
agency and a statement of the significance the agency has attached to them.
5. Holding conferences with interested groups to resolve, narrow, or clarify
disputed issues.
6. Hearing argument of other oral presentation at which agency officials may
ask questions, including questions submitted by interested persons.
7. Allowing cross-examination to resolve specific issues of fact when the agency
considers that to be appropriate.
Byse, supra note 39, at 1825.
The Conference concluded:
An agency should employ any of [these] devices . . . or permit crossexamination only to the extent that it believes that the anticipated costs (including those related to increasing the time involved and the deployment of additional agency resources) are offset by anticipated gains in the quality of the rule
and in the extent to which the rulemaking procedure will be perceived as having
been fair.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,

1976 Report 45-47 (1977).
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judicial review. Rather, he accepts "remand (to the agencyl for further consideration"3 as the proper judicial route.
THE RATIONALE FOR DECISION:

A

CRITICAL VIEW

At the outset of this phase of discussion, one must emphasize the
single most astounding aspect of the Supreme Court's opinion in Vermont Yankee. Having read and re-read the opinions of both federal
courts here involved, I conclude that the Supreme Court's condemnation of the Court of Appeals is based upon assumptions that are unsupported by any fair interpretation of Judge Bazelon's opinion.
The Supreme Court's opinion states that "while the matter is not entirely free from doubt,"'4 the lower court voided the rule at issue
"because of perceived inadequacies of the procedures employed in the
rule making proceedings"4 " by the agency.
It is true that Judge Bazelon's opinion stressed the inadequacies of
NRC fact finding procedures. Indeed, in stressing the inadequacy of
such NRC procedures, Judge Bazelon suggested that different procedures might have to be employed by the NRC upon remand:
Many procedural devices for creating a genuine dialogue on these
issues were available to the agency-including informal conferences
between intervenors and staff, document discovery, interrogatories,
technical advisory committees comprised of outside experts with differing perspectives, limited cross-examination, funding independent
research by intervenors, detailed annotation of technical reports,
surveys of existing literature, memoranda explaining methodology. "
While setting forth suggestions for greater procedural flexibility in
notice and comment" rulemaking, the Court of Appeals' opinion
falls far short of directing the agency to apply particular procedures;
in fact Judge Bazelon emphasizes that, "[wle do not presume to intrude on the agency's province by dictating to it which, if any, of these
devices it must adopt to flesh out the reord.... ITihe proceduresthe
agency adopted in this case, if administered in a more sensitive,
deliberate manner, might suffice.""'
If there be any remaining doubt as to whether the Court of Appeals
was, as the Supreme Court alleged, interfering with an agency's
freedom to fashion its own rules of procedure, 8 it should be dispelled
by the lower court's unequivocal denial of such an intent: "By listing
other techniques ....
which might aid the Commission in compiling
an adequate record, we do not intimate that it must adopt any of
"3Byse, supra note 39, at 1827 (quoting 435 U.S. at 549).
-435 U.S. at 541.
:$Id.
4547 F.2d at 653.
:'ld. at 653-54 (emphasis added).
"435 U.S. at 544.
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them. What is of concern to us is that the record after remand disclose
a thorough ventilation of the issues.""'
There is, in my view, simply no support for the Supreme Court's
assertion that the Court of Appeals had "overturn[ed] the rulemaking
proceeding on the basis of the procedural devices employed.., by the
Commission ... ,,.,
The lower court's focus on the procedures employed, was a practical attempt to inform the agency of ways in which what was an inadequate record could be adequately supplemented. It was clearly the
adequacy of the record in the first instance that triggered
remand-the discussion of additional procedures was merely intended
as a helpful suggestion rather than a judicial mandate-and as such
was mere surplusage, not at all essential to the decision to remand.
Thus it appears that the Supreme Court's harshly worded criticism
of the Court of Appeals' opinion and its seeming rejection of evolving
hybrid-rulemaking procedures is based on assumptions completely
debased by a cursory reading of the lower court's opinion.
It is certainly important to discuss the relative inaccuracy of the
Supreme Court's analysis of the lower court opinion; however, such a
discussion does not detract from the fact that Vermont Yankee is the
law, so to speak. Thus, in reflecting upon the import of the case one
must grapple with its substantive impact on administrative law. The
crux of Vermont Yankee is its implications on the fact-finding procedures which attach in "notice and comment" rulemaking.
While the Supreme Court emphatically rejected judicial interference with agency discretion in developing such procedures, the
Court would be hard pressed to disagree with the proposition that
Congress itself has sanctioned judicial intervention of far greater import. In section 706 of the APA, Congress imposes on a reviewing
court the duty to, inter alia:
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B)contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;"
Congress has recognized the courts as the primary watchdog of administrative agencies. The courts may strike down agency action
which misinterprets enabling legislation; they may remand because
the agency (as determined by a review of the record) has acted ar"1547 F.2d at 654 n. 58.
10435 U.S. at 548. See note 34 and accompanying textual material, supra.
'5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
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bitrarily; and they may void agency action which impinges on constitutional rights. In short, it is an overriding congressional concern
that agencies act according to their statutory charters to carry out
congressional directives, and moreover, that agencies act with
deference to constitutional concerns.
Although not raised in Vermont Yankee, it could logically be
argued that the power of the courts to oversee agency procedures may
fairly be implied from section 706 of the APA. It seems an inescapable
conclusion that a court may be greatly impeded in ferreting out administrative action which subtly, expediently or otherwise exceeds
statutory authority. Can legislatively mandated judicial review be effective if agencies are given procedural carte blanche? Would a Congress which granted substantive judicial review powers to the courts
have intended at the same time to completely bar them from overseecould just as easily be used to circuming procedural matters which
2
vent a statutory mandate?'
Professor Davis argues in the same vein that the Vermont Yankee
court could not have meant that courts may not do their own thinking:
in the light of their own understanding of procedural justice, when they
carry out 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(D), which provides: 'The reviewing court
shall- ... (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be-.. .(D) without observance of procedure required by law .... ' The last word is 'law' not 'statute,' and 'law' includes the ever-growing common law."3
Moreover, contrary to the suggestion of the Vermont Yankee court,
there is nothing in the legislative history of the APA that suggests that
Congress intended that only agencies may decide when and what procedural devices should be used in "notice and comment" rulemaking.

"It is said that constitutional separation of powers concerns deter the courts from intervening in congressional fact-finding and law-making procedures, and by analogy the
courts should not interfere with the quasi-legislative activities of administrative agencies, e.g., "notice and comment" rulemaking.
See Byse, supra note 39.
While such separation of powers arguments may be persuasive when judicial intervention in congressional procedures is involved, the same argument carries considerably less cogency when applied to administrative agencies. Thus, while Congress
may doubtless be the judge of its own legislative procedures, it is submitted that when it
bestows upon an agency the power to flesh out general legislative mandates, the procedures utilized by such an entity are not similarly sacrosanct nor are they so intended
by Congress. A quasi-legislative decision by an agency is, very simply, not the same as
legislative action by Congress itself. If it were the same, Congress would not in the APA
have authorized judicial review. To reiterate, the overriding concern of Congress is that
agencies follow statutory directives-and Congress intends that the Courts play an important role in achieving this end.
"I K. DAVIS, ADMIN. LAw TREATISE, supra note 2, at 610.

VERMONT YANKEE
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The legislative history referred to in Vermont Yankee does indicate
that agencies are to be given discretion in fashioning procedures; but
in that history there is absolutely no explicit or implicit support for
the proposition that Congress intended that the judiciary be barred
from input into all procedural questions. Congressional prohibition of
judicial oversight, at least in some minimally intrusive way, makes little sense.
On the contrary, there is no entity in our governmental system more
experienced or better equipped than the judiciary to oversee the maintainance of procedures which insure both compliance with statutory
mandates and a fair hearing for all concerned. Is there anything in the
nature of an administrative agency that suggests it and it alone is best
equipped to decide such issues? To put the question is to answer it.
It should not be overlooked that the procedural model recommended by the Administrative Conference of the United States and endorsed as a preferable alternative to judicial intervention by Professor
Byse' 4 is, in large part, a creature of hybrid rulemaking procedures
developed by the lower federal courts."' It should also be observed
that the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee overlooked a very recent
indication of congressional approval of judicial intervention in agency procedures. In enacting the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,"0
Congress included the essence of hybrid rulemaking into its amendment to the judicial review section. 7 In so doing Congress indicated
its acceptance of evolving hybrid rulemaking.6"
Moreover, Congress explicitly authorizes courts to become involved
in reviewing agency procedures in section 307(d)(9)(D) of the Clean
Air Act. The House Report states:
In deciding whether or not . . .reversal is warranted on procedural
grounds, the court is directed to consider two factors. The first is
whether the Administrator's determination on the procedural point is
'arbitrary or capricious.'

"Byse, supra note 39, at 1825-26.

"See Stewart, supra note 11, 1819. Professor Stewart states:
The . . . best approach is for courts to provide guidance for ad-

ministrators and litigants by requiring the use of hybrid procedures
likely .

.

. to produce an adequate record for judicial review. Judicial

leadership in this area has in most instances been tempered by realistic
awareness of the need for administrative flexibility and the drawbacks
of excessive procedural formalities. The highly useful "paper hearing"
innovations, which have resulted from a process of judicial prod and
agency response, have been endorsed by Congress and the Administrative Conference (footnotes omitted).
5"42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1977).
'p42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1977).
"See Pedersen, supra note 2, at 45.
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The second is whether procedural errors 'were so serious and related
to matters of such central relevance to the rule that there is a substantial
likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed if such
errors had not been made.'"
The Clean Air Act Amendments pointedly affirm congressional
faith in the judicial review function in general, and the courts'
development of hybrid rulemaking in particular. In light of congressional action with regard to judicial review of agency procedural
matters it seems all the more obvious that the focal point of congressional concern with regard to judicial review of agency "notice and
comment" rulemaking (be it substantive or procedural) is not to
guard against judicial usurpation of agency perogatives-but rather,
quite rightly-to insure that the agencies fully comply with their
statutory mandate. To the extent that deficient agency procedures interfere with this object the courts (utilizing their experience and expertise in procedural matters) can and should play a limited, albeit important, role in overseeing agency procedures.
Summarizing the impact of Vermont Yankee on administrative
law, Professor Davis' analysis of the case is worth repeating:
The Vermont Yankee opinion is largely one of those rare opinions in
which a unanimous Supreme Court speaks with little or no authority.
The Court lacks power to change the law through sweeping generalizations that are unsupported by close analysis. When the Court is
unanimous, it has enormous power to change the law by carefully considering all facets of the problem before it and by systematically
answering the reasonable questions about the problem that an informed
person would raise. The Vermont Yankee opinion is not that kind of
opinion."
One can only hope that Vermont Yankee is, indeed, aberrational and that the courts may continue their enlightened oversight of the evolution of administrative procedures.
59H. R. REP. No. 294,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD.NEWS 1077, 1401.
"01 K. DAvis, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE, supra note 2. at 616.

